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I. Introduction
With the European Union (EU) racing towards the January 1,
1998 full liberalization of telecommunications,' the European
Commission (the Commission) has faced a large number of
technical issues and policy disputes. Because liberalization and
deregulation have the underlying objective of introducing
competition 2 into this sector, the Commission's Competition
Directorate (DGIV) has been formulating the appropriate
competition policies.' This article examines the competition issues
I See Council Resolution on the Review of the Situation in the
Telecommunications Sector and the Need for Further Development in that Market, 1993
O.J. (C 213). For an excellent overview of the liberalization process over the past
decade, see Wolf Sauter, The Telecommunications Law of the European Union, 5 EUt.
L.J. 92 (1995). See generally Commission of the European Communities, Towards a
Dynamic European Economy: Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market
for Telecommunications Services and Equipment, COM(87)290 (providing the roots for
liberalization on a Union-wide basis).
2 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") member
countries with the longest experience in liberalization of international and trunk services
provide increasing evidence of the achievement of substantial gains for users, including
reduced prices, improved quality of service, innovative service offerings, and greater
customer choice. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
TELECOMMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE BENEFITS OF COMPETITION (1995).
3 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) more clearly defined and strengthened the
Commission's regulatory policies in two cases where Member States challenged the
Commission's powers to act under, inter alia, Article 90 of the EC treaty (infra note 20).
See Commission Directive 88/301 on Terminal Equipment, 1988 O.J. (L 131) 73;
Commission Directive 90/388 on Telecommunications Services, 1990 O.J. (L 192) 10
[hereinafter Services Directive]. These two judgments empowered the Commission to
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that arise in connection with access and interconnection to the
networks of the incumbent Telecommunications Organizations
(TOs),' which have always held positions in the Member States as
public monopolies. As Dr. Herbert Ungerer has noted,
"interconnection represents the most important manifestation of
the call for a finely tuned and flexible balance between telecoms
regulation and competition rules . . . ." Because of the need to
balance regulation and competition rules and the impossibility of
obtaining the full picture of European telecommunications
liberalization otherwise, this Article will consider not only the
operation of the competition rules but also the complementary
operation of the regulatory mechanisms which traditionally have
been seen as separate from competition concerns.6 Liberalization
legislate under Article 90 of the EC Treaty with the objective of abolishing or restricting
exclusive rights of Telecommunications Organizations (TOs) which are based on state
measures. The Commission may also legislate whenever such powers have been
delegated by the European Council. See Case C-202/88, France v. Commission, 1991
E.C.R. 1-1223, 1224; Joined Cases C-271/90, C-281/90 & C-289/90, Spain v.
Commission, 1992 E.C.R. 1-5833, 5884.
" The term "PTT," which refers to the Post, Telegraph and Telephone monopolies
in the EU, is no longer used, as postal services have been separated from
telecommunications services in the Member States.
5 Herbert Ungerer, Head of Division, Telecommunications, Posts R, Information
Society Coordination, Directorate General for Competition, European Commission
Telecommunications, Competition & Strategic Partnerships, Speech at the 1996
European Communications Summit (visited May 15, 1997) <http://europa.eu.int/
en/comm/dg04/speech/six/en/sp96042.htm>.
6 Traditionally a distinction has been drawn between classical regulation and
competition, or antitrust, laws. While regulation tries to replicate the results of
competition or correct for the defects of competitive markets, competition laws seek to
create or maintain the conditions of a competitive marketplace. For an excellent
treatment of these issues of regulation and antitrust, see STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION
AND ITS REFORM ch. 8 (1982). Some claim that the telecommunications industry is not
experiencing deregulation per se, but rather a shift in the form of regulation of the
telephone industry from the "bottom-up" approach of cost-based rate regulation to a top-
down approach relying upon antitrust and other laws to regulate the industry through
after-the-fact punishment of anti-competitive conduct. See John J. Flynn, Legal
Approach to Market Dominance: Assessing Market Power in Antitrust Cases, in
TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION (John R. Allison & Dennis L. Thomas, eds.,
1990). During this period of transition to full competition, the TOs may remain
dominant, and such dominance demands some form of transitory regulation. The
"demands for some form of temporary or continuing regulation during the transition to
deregulation can be explained almost entirely as a response to the strength of the entry
threat relative to the magnitude of sunk costs incurred by the affected parties in the
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
in the world's telecommunications sectors has paralleled the
American divestiture of AT&T in 1982' and the subsequent
regulatory reforms. Thus, this Article will take a comparative
approach in order to shed some light on the Commission's
approach and the possible alternatives in light of this parallel.
Section II provides an introduction to the importance of
interconnection in telecommunications liberalization, while
Section III examines the regulatory framework thus far established
by the institutions of the EU. Section IV provides a substantive
analysis of the European Commission's latest draft Notice on
access to incumbent TOs networks within the context of the well-
established principles of European competition law. Section V
considers the latest directive on interconnection drafted by the
European Council, and Section VI concludes this Article.
II. The Meaning and Nature of Interconnection in the
European Union
The Commission has defined "interconnection" as "the
physical and logical linking of the telecommunications facilities of
organizations providing telecommunications networks and/or
telecommunications services, in order to allow the users of one
organization to communicate with the users of the same or another
organization or to access services provided by third
organizations."8 Interconnection is clearly the sine qua non of a
telecommunications industry seeking to function with competing
operators and service providers.
Several features of the telecommunications industry encourage
the perception of the industry as a natural monopoly.9 First, like
other utilities and network industries, the telecommunications
previous regulatory regime." John R. Meyer & William B. Tye, The Consequences of
Deregulation in the Transportation and Telecommunications Sector: The Regulator
Transition, 75 AM. EcoN. Rv. 46, 46 (1985). Most importantly, the relationship
between the competition policy and regulation should be mutually reinforcing.
7 See generally United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131
(D.D.C. 1982), afd sub nom, Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
S Commission Directive 96/19 on Full Competition in Telecommunications
Markets, 1996 O.J. (L 74) 13 [hereinafter Full Competition Directive]. This directive
substantially amended the Services Directive, supra note 3.
9 See MARTIN CAVE ET AL., COMPETITION ASPECTS OF ACCESS PRICING, REPORT TO
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 5 (1996).
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industry exhibits economies of scale in output of the service.
Second, the industry also experiences economies of scope, wherein
the TO can employ the existing trenches and ducts used to supply
telecommunications services for the provision of new services."
Finally, the telecommunications industry embodies network
externalities; the utility each customer reaps by participating in a
network rises with the number of'other customers with whom he
or she can communicate."2  For these reasons, the
telecommunications industry was long considered to be a good
example of a "natural monopoly."' 3 This view, however, no longer
carries any weight.14
Because these features of the European telecommunications
10 See id. Economists like J.S. Bain have shown that economies of scale can
operate as barriers to entry. See J.S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956). A
barrier to entry may be defined as "a cost of producing (at some or every rate of output)
which must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by firms
already in the industry." G.S. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67 (1968),
quoted in OLIVER STEHMANN, NETWORK COMPETITION FOR EUROPEAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 57 (1995).
I1 See CAVE ET AL., supra note 9, at 5. This is particularly true since the
boundaries between the various forms of media and communication (telephone, cable,
and television) are blurring.
12 See id.
13 In a "natural monopoly," the entire demand for a good or service can be
supplied at a lower cost by one firm rather, than by several. The industry can take the
form of a public monopoly, as in the case of the Member States of the European Union,
or it can take the form of a private regulated monopoly, like AT&T in the United States
prior to its divestiture in 1982. However, at least one view under traditional economic
analysis asserts that little empirical evidence can be found .for a natural monopoly in
telecommunications networks. See STEHMANN, supra note 10, at 50; see also ALFRED E.
KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS, VOL. 2:
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ch. 4 (1971) (providing a classic discussion of the concept of
"natural monopolies" as applied to the telecommunications industry).
14 Several events contributed to the downfall of the natural monopoly argument.
These include: technological change; the convergence of telecommunications and
information technology that led to an increase in potential market entrants (e.g., a cable
company offering both video and telephony over its networks); the spill-over of
international regulatory change, in particular coming from the changes in the United
States after the divestiture of AT&T (The United Kingdom, however, was also active in
the earlier part of the 1980s in reforming its regulation of telecommunications.); the
internal market program which exposed the PTTs as inefficient and as a source of
competitive disadvantage for European industry; and the influence of powerful
industrial lobbies. See Sauter, supra note 1.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
industry continue to characterize the industry as liberalization
occurs, the shared use of infrastructure, i.e., interconnection,
provides the key to viable competition in the industry. For years,
the incumbent TOs have occupied positions of dominance
obtained through years of natural vertically integrated
monopolistic control. Industry competition will not realistically
develop if new entrants are to be expected to independently
construct the infrastructure required for the operation of a
telecommunications system. New providers of voice telephony
must be allowed, for call completion purposes, to interconnect
their service with the existing network controlled by the TOs.Y
Furthermore, if there is to be any effective competition, other
services, such as directory assistance by the TOs, must also be
supplied."t
Contracts, in the form of interconnection agreements, govern
the relationship created between the new entrant and the
incumbent TO. One of the central issues in the analysis of such
agreements turns on the interconnection tariffs charged by the
TOs. Regulators should question whether the interconnection
tariff charged by the TO is too high to allow the entry of an
efficient and otherwise profitable firm whose entry would increase
total economic welfare and increase consumer utility. 7 Of course,
this question is not easily answered, since the rates for
interconnection affect the amount of entry, and the amount of
entry can affect the socially optimal price of interconnection." At
15 The TOs may control facilities that are essential for the operation of the
telecommunications system as a whole. See Draft Notice, infra note 31, at 18-19. See
infra notes 77-153 and accompanying text for a discussion of the doctrine of "essential
facilities" in competition law.
16 Without access to the directories held by the TOs, the new entrant cannot hope
to provide services to customers competitively.
17 See Alexander C. Larson, Reforming Telecommunications Policy in Response to
Entry into Local Exchange Markets, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 28 (1995).
Larson also notes that "socially optimal interconnection terms should serve as a check
against inefficient entrants and ensure that firms that accept them can reasonably be
expected to increase consumer surplus (e.g. through lower prices) in the downstream
market. The difficult part, of course, is knowing what the socially optimal terms of
interconnection are." Id. at 29.
IS See id. at 26. In economic terms, the question for the regulatory authority is
whether to choose the optimal allowed interconnection rate or the number of entrants to
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the very least, the amount of entry can determine observed prices. 9
III. An Introduction to the Regulation of Access and
Interconnection
While the notions of "access" and "interconnection" both
apply to the introduction of competition in European
telecommunications, it may be helpful to draw a distinction
between the two terms. For the purposes of this Article, "access"
revolves around the need for new entrants to have physical access
to facilities, currently controlled by the TOs, that are essential for
effective competition. The discussion will focus on possible
violations of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community (EC Treaty).2" As for "interconnection," the
main issues involve the actual terms and conditions of
interconnection agreements, for example, interconnection pricing
and collocation.
The EC's regulatory scheme for access and interconnection
can be found in several different documents. 2' The development of
the regulatory framework can be traced to the 1990 Council
Directive on the Establishment of the Internal Market for
Telecommunications Services Through the Implementation of
Open Network Provision (the ONP Directive).22 The ONP
maximize total surplus, which includes total consumer surplus and the profits of both the
incumbent monopolist and the entrants. See id.
19 Ultimately, marginal costs would determine optimal pricing. See id.
20 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C
224) 6, 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY], contained within and
incorporating the changes of the TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION (TEU), Feb. 7, 1992,
1992 O.J. (C 224) 1 [1992], 1 C.M.L.R. 719 (1992). The TEU amended the TREATY
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11,
1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II), as amended by the SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT,
1987 O.J. (L 169) 1 [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 (1987), in Treaties Establishing the
European Communities (EC Off'I Pub. Off. 1987).
21 The general rule of EC lawmaking is that "the Commission proposes, the
Parliament advises, and the Council adopts." Judge Diane P. Wood, Lecture at the
University of Chicago (Winter Quarter 1996-97). The Commission also has rather
significant power under Article 90(3) of EC Treaty to issue directives to Member States
to ensure that public enterprises (called "undertakings" in the EC Treaty) operate within
the boundaries of Treaty rules. The Commission also regularly issues Notices and
Communications in the Official Journal.
22 Council Directive No. 90/387 1990 O.J. (L 192) 1 [hereinafter ONP Directive].
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 23
Directive, issued pursuant to Article 100a of the EC Treaty, "is
concerned with the harmonization of conditions for open and
efficient access to and use of public telecommunications networks
and, where applicable, public telecommunications services,
'2 3
particularly technical interfaces, usage and tariff conditions. "The
ONP Directive was intended to allow competitive service
providers the use of the monopoly network."'24 The ONP Directive
establishes the following principles. ONP conditions must: (1)
"be based on objective criteria;" (2) "be transparent and published
in an appropriate manner;" (3) "guarantee equality of access[,]
and" (4) "must be non-discriminatory, in accordance with
Community law.
25
The ONP framework particularly focuses on public
telecommunications networks. 26 Accordingly, the ONP Directive
would not apply to interconnection agreements between private
networks and service providers.27 On the other hand, competition
rules are fundamentally applied to any competition problem,
whether it arises in a public or private network.2' Although the
The companion directive issued by the Commission did not deal with access and
interconnection as originally issued; rather, it addressed the general liberalization of the
services market within certain time frames, and dealt with the scope of licensing
conditions. See Services Directive, supra note 3, arts. 2, 7, at 15-16. It was only when
it was amended by the Full Competition Directive that interconnection was considered.
Article 4a was added to require that "Member States shall ensure that the
telecommunications organizations provide interconnection to their voice telephony
service and public switched telecommunications network to other undertakings
authorized to provide such services or networks, on non-discriminatory, proportional
and transparent terms, which are based on objective criteria." Article 4a goes on to
require that Member States ensure that TOs publish the terms and conditions of
interconnection by July 1, 1997, and adopt reasoned decisions where commercial
negotiations as to interconnection do not lead to an agreement. Article 4b requires
Member States to ensure that all exclusive rights with regard to directory services within
their respective territories are lifted. Id. arts. 2 & 7.
23 ONP Directive, supra note 22, art. 1.1.
24 Sauter, supra note 1, at 106.
25 ONP Directive, supra note 22, art. 3.1.
26 See ONP Directive, supra note 22.
27 Considering that privatization usually follows liberalization, this point proves
significant.
28 See Herbert Ungerer, Telecommunications and EC Competition Law IBC
Conference, Brussels, Sept. 19, 1996 (visited May 15, 1997) <http://
europa.eu.int/en/comm/dgO4/speech/six/ensp96046.htm>.
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ONP framework and its implementation by national regulatory
authorities in national interconnection regimes should be the "first
port of call," 9 a more specific regulatory mechanism is required to
address access and interconnection issues. The Commission
should apply competition rules to the regulation of access and
interconnection in order to directly subject telecommunications to
Commission sanctions, including fines." Recently, the
Commission noted that, given the detailed nature of ONP rules,
which may go beyond competition rules, "undertakings operating
in the telecommunications sector should be aware that compliance
with the Community competition rules does not absolve them of
their duty to abide by obligations imposed in the ONP context, and
vice versa."'" Perhaps the relationship between the ONP
framework and the competition rules is best seen simply as a
complementary regulatory mechanism, although competition rules
do not quite fit into the commonly understood realm of
"regulation."3
Two important documents illustrate this complementary
relationship. First, the Commission issued the Notice on the
Application of the Competition Rules to Access Agreements in the
29 Id.
30 The Commission may impose fines of up to 10% of the annual worldwide
turnover of undertakings which intentionally or negligently breach Article 85(1) or
Article 86. See Commission Regulation 17 of 6 February 1962 First Regulation
Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, art. 15(2), 1962 J.O. (13) 204/62.
31 Communication from the Commission on the Application of the Competition
Rules to Access Agreements in the Telecommunications Sector-Framework, Relevant
Markets and Principles, 1997 O.J. (C 76) 9 [hereinafter Draft Notice].
32 "[C]ompetition rules may be applied to check the effectiveness of ONP
principles as they are interpreted by national regulators, to ensure full conformity with
competition policy goals." Ungerer, supra note 5.
[I]t is obvious that Community Acts adopted in the telecommunications sector
are to be interpreted in a way consistent with competition rules, so as to ensure
the best possible implementation of all aspects of the Community
telecommunications policy .... This applies, inter alia, to the relationship
between competition rules applicable to undertakings and the ONP rules.
Commission Guidelines on the Application of EEC Competition Rules in the
Telecommunications Sector, 1991 O.J. (C 233) 2, 5 [hereinafter Telecommunications
Guidelines].
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Telecommunications Sector3 (Draft Notice) on March 11, 1997.3.
The Draft Notice illustrates how competition rules per se will be
applied to issues of access to the telecommunications network,
which is currently dominated by the incumbent TOs.35 Second, the
final text of the long-awaited Interconnection Directive
(Interconnection Directive) was passed by the European
Parliament and Council on June 30, 1997.36 The Interconnection
Directive applies the ONP framework to the terms and conditions
of interconnection agreements.
Why have a directive" for interconnection terms, but only a
Notice on the application of competition rules? Perhaps the
existing European case law has not developed sufficiently to deal
with competition issues relating to access and interconnection. For
the moment, the Commission has decided to refrain from adopting
binding legal rules regarding the application of Articles 85 and 86
and, instead, has chosen to utilize a non-binding Notice until the
33 See Draft Notice, supra note 31.
34 Another proposed directive of some significance is the Proposed Parliament and
Council Directive on the Application of Open Network Provision (ONP) to voice
telephony and on Universal Service for Telecommunications in a Competitive
Environment, COM (96) 419. This new directive will replace the Parliament and
Council Directive, Commission Directive 95/62, 1995 O.J. (L 321) 6. The Directive was
designed to apply the ONP principles to fully liberalized infrastructures and services
(including voice telephony). See id.
35 The Draft Notice "sets competition policy within the context of the broader
overall EU framework in the area of interconnection; that is, it defines and clarifies the
relationship between competition law and sector specific legislation under the Article
100A framework which, in this case, is set out in the draft ONP interconnection
directive." Ungerer, supra note 5.
36 See Directive 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Interconnection in Telecommunications with Regard to Ensuring Universal Service and
Interoperatability through Application of the Principles of Open Network Provision
(ONP), 1997 O.J. (L 199) 32. [hereinafter Interconnection Directive]. For a better
perspective of the principles behind this directive, see Liberalization of
Telecommunications Infrastructure and Cable Television Networks: Part I-Principles
and Timetable, COM (94) 440 final, and Part l-A Common Approach to the Provision
of Infrastructure for Telecommunications in the European Union, COM(94)682 final.
, 37 'The generally accepted position in EC law is that where provisions of directives
appear to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, they have direct effect in the
Member States, implying that Member States may not implement laws or regulations
which are incompatible with such provisions of the directive.
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Commission's position is more clear." However, although the
Notice per se may not be binding, a National Regulatory Authority
(NRA) cannot approve terms of access that are contrary to the EC
competition rules. Such approval would place Member States in
breach of Articles 3(g) and 5 of the EC Treaty, and Article 169 of
the EC Treaty would apply.39
IV. Competition Aspects of Access and Interconnection
This Article aims first to identify the competition issues that
arise on questions of access to networks of TOs and then examines
them in the wider context of EC competition rules. This section
discusses two main areas. First, it will consider the Article 86
analysis of actions by the TOs, which may include refusal to allow
access to their networks, discriminatory pricing, and tying
arrangements. Second, it will discuss the Article 85 analysis of
interconnection agreements between undertakings.
As noted, the Commission has produced a Draft Notice on the
application of the competition rules to access agreements in the
telecommunications sector.' ° This Draft Notice4' was intended to
build upon the 1991 Telecommunications Guidelines on the
application of competition rules in the telecommunications
sector.42
A. Analysis Under Article 86
The approach to any potential Article 86 problem is quite
settled and is comprised of two steps. First, the Commission
determines if an undertaking has achieved a dominant position.
38 The Commission seems to have adopted the suggestion by Coudert Bros. in their
report to the Commission on this matter. See COUDERT BROS., COMPETITION ASPECTS OF
INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENTS IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR (1995).
39 ,See Draft Notice, supra note 31, at 18; Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen v. Zentrale zur
Bekampfung Unlauteren Wettbewerbs, 1989 E.C.R. 803.
40 See Draft Notice, supra note 3 1.
41 It should be noted that the Draft Notice does not derogate from the rights of the
individual or undertaking under Community law, and is without prejudice to any
interpretation of the EC competition rules by the Court of First Instance (CFI) or ECJ.
42 See Telecommunications Guidelines, supra note 32, at 9. It should be noted that
the Guidelines do not create enforceable rights and do not bind the Commission, the
European Court of Justice, or the NRAs. See id.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Second, the Commission determines if the undertaking has abused
that dominant position.
1. Dominance of Telecommunications Organizations0'
In Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission," the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) defined dominance as:
a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking
which enables it to prevent effective competition being
maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to
behave to an appreciable extent independently of its
competitors, its customer and... consumers .... [It] enables
the undertaking to have an appreciable influence on the
41
conditions under which competition will develop ....
As noted in this definition, dominance must occur within a
defined, "relevant" market. In Europemballage Corporation v.
Commission," the ECJ emphasized that the definition of relevant
market is of "essential significance," since "the possibilities of
competition can only be judged in relation to those characteristics
of the products in question by virtue of which those products are
particularly apt to satisfy an inelastic need and are only to a
limited extent interchangeable with other products.' 7 The relevant
market is usually defined from the point ofview both of the
product and services involved and its geographic context.4
In the telecommunications sector, firms operated as legal
monopolies in the Member States for many years. However, the
ECJ has held that national laws that precipitate or encourage the
absence of competition or its restriction on the relevant market are
43 The concept of "joint dominance," a possibility recognized by the Commission
in section 1.3 of the Draft Notice, will not be discussed in this article.
4 Case 85/76, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 520. Article 86 is silent as to what constitutes
"dominance." See Draft Notice, supra note 31.
41 Hoffman-La Roche, 1979 E.C.R. at 520. This was also essentially the definition
given in an earlier ECJ judgment. See Case 27/76, United Brands Co. v. Commission
1978 E.C.R. 207.
4 Case 6/72, Europemballage Corp. v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 215.
47 Id. at 247.
4 See, e.g., Case 247/86, Societe Alsacienne et Lorraine de Telecommunications et
d'Electronique v. Novasam Alsatel, 1988 E.C.R. 5987.
[Vol. 23
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still subject to Article 86.49
In the realm of access and interconnection, it is still not
entirely clear how the "relevant market" should be defined, since
the fully liberalized telecommunications industry is still inchoate,
and there is as yet no judicial guidance. ° However, the
Commission or NRAs could assess how the present industry fits
into the traditional relevant market analysis by examining both the
products and services at issue and the geographic market. In any
case, the classic test of demand substitutability will remain
critical.
2
(a) The Relevant Product or Services Market
In the Draft Notice, the Commission has defined the relevant
product market to "comprise[] all those products and/or services
which are regarded as interchangeable and substitutable by the
49 See Case 311/84, CBEM Benelux SA v. Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de
Telediffusion SA, 1985 E.C.R. 3261, 3275; see also Case 41/83, Italy v. Commission,
1985 E.C.R. 873; Case 13/77, NV GB-Inno-BM v. ATAB, 1977 E.C.R. 2115; Case
26/75, General Motors v. Commission, 1975 E.C.R. 1367.
50 This author is not aware of any judicial decisions on this point at the time of
writing.
51 Although the Draft Notice does not state precisely what test will be used to
determine demand substitutability, the test is identified as that of the cross-elasticity of
demand. See COUDERT BROS., supra note 38, at 89. Cross-elasticity of demand is
defined as the rate at which consumers would switch from one product to the other in
response to a price increase. See, e.g., ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBENFELD,
MICROECONOMICS 31-35 (1998). This approach may be contrasted with that taken in the
American antitrust test of own elasticity of demand, where the analysis does not involve
any reference to other products; the focus is simply on how much the demand for the
firm's product would decrease if the firm increases its price. See id. This latter approach
is arguably more reliable, particularly in the early stages of telecommunications
liberalization, since it would be very difficult, if not impossible, considering the TO's
monopoly positions, to find substitutes which consumers would switch to in response to
a TO's increase in prices under the test of cross-elasticity of demand.
52 See Draft Notice, supra note 31, at 16. The Commission has stated, however,
that in the definition of relevant markets, supply-side substitutability will generally not
be used. See id. This attitude towards supply-side substitutability must be correct
because the TOs are in effect the only suppliers of the products and services in the
industry. Even though the capacity of existing infrastructures, such as CATV networks,
may be enhanced to expand the capacity to carry a variety of telecommunications
signals, such infrastructure will likely prove incapable of establishing the market
position necessary to satisfy the short-term needs of new entrants. See COUDERT BROS.,
supra note 38, at 90-91.
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consumer, by reason of the products' characteristics, their prices
and their intended use." 3 Considering that the TOs control the
only currently existing network infrastructures for access and
interconnection, can it be said that there is a true "market" for the
facility itself,4 even though the infrastructure, as built, can be seen
as an input of the firm? The definition chosen by the Commission
for the purposes of the Draft Notice, taken from traditional Article
86 analysis, does not appear to fit comfortably with the concept of
access to networks. On the other hand, the Commission has
recognized that in addition to physical access to the network
"facility," new entrants also need access to other service facilities
in order to market these services to customers.5 Directory
assistance is a good example of this "other" type of facility. The
Commission needs to recognize this need, as it widens the scope
of the market definition to include not just the need for access to
the infrastructure of the TOs, but also any relevant
telecommunications services which, being held by the TO, would
put it in a position to prevent effective competition in the market
for those services.
The Commission has also noted that there are really two types
of relevant product markets to consider: (1) the service to end
users; and (2) the access to facilities necessary to provide that
service. 6  The recognition of access to facilities as a relevant
market is necessary to determine the interchangeability of certain
types of telecommunications infrastructure. For example, a new
entrant may want to provide cable television and telephony, but
the TO's infrastructure may not be able to carry such signals.
Nevertheless, on a local fixed network, a new entrant desiring to
provide standard telephony services would be forced to
interconnect with that network operator, and that would clearly be
13 Draft Notice, supra note 31, at 16. This is consistent with the notion of relevant
markets as stated by the ECJ in Hoffman-La Roche: "[t]here is a sufficient degree of
interchangeability between all the products forming part of the same market insofar as a
specific use of such products is concerned." Case 85/76, E.C.R. Hoffman-La Roche v,
Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 516. However, the Commission has included services
within this definition.
54 See COUDERT BROS., supra note 38, at 89.
55 See Draft Notice, supra note 31, at 17.
56 See id. at 16.
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considered the relevant market5 7 The Commission has sensibly
noted that, given the pace of technological change, "[t]he
definition of particular product markets is best done in the light of
a detailed examination of an individual case.,
58
(b) The Relevant Geographic Market
Article 86 of the EC Treaty prohibits abuse of a dominant
position "within the common market or in a substantial part of
it."59  In Suiker Unie v. Commission,6o the ECJ stated that to
determine whether a particular area could be considered to be a
"substantial part" of the common market, it is necessary to
examine "the pattern and volume of the production and
consumption of the said product as well as the habits and
economic opportunities of vendors and purchasers."' The ECJ
held in United Brands v. Commission62 that a geographic market
can exist where "conditions of competition are sufficiently
homogeneous for the effect of the economic power of the
undertaking concerned to be evaluated . . . . [T]he objective
considerations of competition applying to the product in question
must be the same for all traders."63
In the Draft Notice, the Commission defined the relevant
geographic market as "the area in which the undertakings
concerned are involved in the supply and demand of products or
57 That assumes, of course, interchangeability of the telecommunications
infrastructure of the local network operator and the new entrant.
58 Draft Notice, supra note 31, at 16. In addition, the Commission intends to
employ a test where a market is considered a separate relevant market if, when all the
suppliers of the services in question raised their prices by five to ten percent, their
collective profits will rise. See id. at 16. A similar test is employed in the U.S. Merger
Guidelines, where, in most contexts, a price increase of five percent would be deemed to
constitute a "small but significant and nontransitory" increase, employed by monopolists
where it would be profitable to do so. See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. CCH 13,104, at 20,569 (Sept. 10, 1992).
59 EC TREATY, art. 86.
60 Joined Cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 and 114/73, Suiker Unie v.
Commission, 1975 E.C.R. 1663, 1666.
61 Id. at 1977.
62 Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207.
63 Id. at 270, 274.
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services, in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently
homogenous and which can be distinguished from neighbouring
areas because the conditions of competition are appreciably
different in those areas."64 Applying this definition in-the context
of access and interconnection in the telecommunications industry,
the relevant geographic market would be the area to which the new
entrants need access and which includes their potential customers,
or simply the area in which the objective conditions of competition
applying to service providers are similar.
(c) Determination of Dominance
The TOs have always been protected by exclusive and special
rights and have held monopolies over the telecommunications
infrastructures in the Member States. The Commission recognizes
that merely ending legal monopolies does not put an end to market
dominance." During the initial phase of liberalization, the TOs
will maintain dominant positions; the development of effective
competition will take time. In the Draft Notice, the Commission
has indicated that it will consider three factors in determining
whether a TO is dominant.66 First, the Commission scrutinizes the
operator's market share. An absolute market share of over fifty
percent is "usually sufficient to demonstrate dominance. ' '67 Of
course, under EC competition rules, a market share of less than
fifty percent may also indicate dominance. The Commission has
even noted that a dominant position "cannot even be ruled out in
respect of market shares between 20% and 40%.",68 The
Commission notes that, since under the ONP framework a TO
with a market share of more than twenty-five percent would
normally be considered to have "significant market power," the
Commission "will take account of whether an undertaking has
been notified69 as having significant market power under the ONP
64 Draft Notice, supra note 31, at 17.
65 See id. at 18.
66 See id. at 18-20.
67 Id. at 19.
68 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
(Tenth Report) 103 n.4 (1980).
69 It should be borne in mind that notification here refers to the situation whereby
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rules in its appraisal under the competition rules."7 It is not quite
clear how such consideration would affect the analysis of
dominance. Under the provisions of the Interconnection Directive,
NRAs may determine that an organization with a market share of
less than twenty-five percent in the relevant market has significant
market power; they may also determine that an organization with a
market share of more than twenty-five percent in the relevant
market does not have significant market power.7 Perhaps the
Commission is ensuring that it will not rule that an undertaking
occupies a position of dominance within the relevant market if the
NRA has held that the same undertaking does not have significant
market power.
Second, the Commission considers market data on the
coverage of the network. Because access revolves around the
need of new entrants for access to the TO's networks, the
Commission will consider "the number of customers who have
subscribed to services comparable with those which the requesting
access intends to provide." 3 This data is obtained as the number of
subscribers "connected to termination points of the
telecommunications network of the undertaking" under scrutiny,
and is "expressed as a percentage of the total number of
subscribers connected to termination points in the relevant
geographic market."'74
The third factor studied in the determination of dominance is
the TO's control of "essential facilities." The Commission has
categorically stated that "[a] company controlling the access to an
essential facility enjoys a dominant position within the meaning of
Article 86.""7 Because controversy still surrounds this particular
doctrine, the doctrine is considered in detail below.
the NRA notifies an undertaking that it has "significant market power."
70 Draft Notice, supra note 31, at 19.
71 See Interconnection Directive, supra note 36, art. 4.3, at 37.
72 See Draft Notice, supra note 31, at 19.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 19. The Commission also recognizes that a company may enjoy a
dominant position without controlling an essential facility. See id. at 18.
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2. Abuse of Dominance
The Draft Notice clearly indicates that the Commission
considers a TO's refusal to grant access to essential facilities, and
the application of unfavorable terms to such access, to be the most
important abuses of a dominant position.76 The novelty of the
essential facilities doctrine to the European telecommunications
sector merits a detailed discussion of the doctrine as applied in the
EU.
(a) The Essential Facilities Doctrine--American Roots
on Community Soil"
The essential facilities doctrine developed under American
antitrust theory.78 In MCI Communications Corp. v. A.T.&T. Co.,79
the Seventh Circuit set forth four elements necessary to establish
liability under the essential facilities doctrine: (1) control of the
essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability
76 Certainly, it has been prophesied that "[t]he 'essential facility' is one of the
concepts most likely to be elaborated, or litigated, soon." Herbert Ungerer, EC
Competition Law in the Telecommunications, Media and Information Technology
Sectors, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1111, 1173 (1996) [hereinafter Ungerer, EC
Competition Law].
77 A very detailed analysis of the doctrine as a whole is beyond the scope of this
Article. Several sources provide additional detail. See Philip Areeda, Essential
Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1989);
Frank A. Edgar, Jr., The Essential Facilities Doctrine and Public Utilities: Another
Layer of Regulation?, 29 IDAHO L. REv. 283 (1992-93); Mark Furse, The 'Essential
Facilities' Doctrine in Community Law, [1995] 8 ECLR 469; Allen Kezsbom & Alan
V. Goldman, No Shortcut to Antitrust Analysis: The Twisted Journey of the "Essential
Facilities" Doctrine, 1996 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1 (1996); John Temple Lang, Defining
Legitimate Competition; Companies' Duties to Supply Competitors and Access to
Essential Facilities, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 437 (1994); Derek Ridyard, Essential
Facilities and the Obligation to Supply Competitors Under UK and EC Competition
Law, [1996] 8 ECLR 438.
78 Sources in the United States often cite United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n
as the foundation of the "essential facilities" doctrine. In that case, several railroads
controlled the only bridge into St. Louis and denied access to the bridge to nonmember
railroads. The Supreme Court declared that the bridge was a bottleneck and ordered the
defendants either to give the nonmember railroads the option of becoming owners or to
allow them access to the facility on nondiscriminatory terms. See United States v.
Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912); see also Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
79 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
1997] LIBERALIZATION OF EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 19
practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the
denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the
feasibility of providing access to the facility."
The Supreme Court of the United States has neither accepted
nor rejected the essential facilities doctrine."' Many commentators
have criticized the doctrine as having no real substantive legal
basis and have charged that it provides an easy way for plaintiffs
to establish liability, diluting traditional antitrust principles in the
process." This criticism is well founded. A plaintiff surely should
not be relieved of the burden of establishing the traditional
elements of antitrust. Like any plaintiff invoking section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 3 a plaintiff utilizing the essential facilities doctrine
should still be required to show actual monopolization or
attempted monopolization, including intent, in a relevant market.
4
Some argue that many cases cited as examples of the doctrine's
purported application could or should be analyzed under some
accepted section two theory, such as monopoly leveraging" or
abuse of monopoly power. 6 The mere denial of access to an
"essential facility" should not of itself lead to a presumption of
anticompetitive intent and necessarily imply that the facility-
owner's market power in the downstream market has increased as
80 See id. at 1132.
81 In Aspen Skiing, the Supreme Court noted that it was "unnecessary to consider
the possible relevance of the 'essential facilities' doctrine, or the somewhat hypothetical
question whether nonexclusionary conduct could ever constitute an abuse of monopoly
power if motivated by an anticompetitive purpose." Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 611 n.44 (1985).
82 See, e.g., Areeda, supra note 77; Kezsbom & Goldman, supra note 77.
13 15 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq.
8 See Kezsbom & Goldman, supra note 77, at 34-36.
85 "Monopoly leveraging" refers to the use of monopoly power in the relevant
product market to achieve an unfair competitive advantage in an ancillary market. This
approach, however, has received little favor. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United
Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 546-49 (9th Cir. 1991). The more accepted view seems to
be that, in order to establish the offense, the defendant must not only have a monopoly
position in the first market, but it must also engage in conduct which threatens to
monopolize the second market. See PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMp,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION
(1996).
86 See Kezsbom & Goldman, supra note 77.
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a result of that denial. As Judge Posner has said, "[A] firm with
lawful monopoly power has no general duty to help its
competitors, whether by holding a price umbrella over their heads
or otherwise by pulling its competitive punches.' 7
While courts in the United States have not exactly embraced
the essential facilities doctrine, the situation in Europe is quite
different. It appears from the comments in the annual competition
reports that the Commission "took a conscious decision . . . to
introduce the 'essential facilities' doctrine into Community law."'8
In fact, it has even been claimed that the "doctrine has been
present, in substance if not in name," in EC competition law for
many years." Why has the doctrine been embraced so readily in
the European Union, while American courts question its pedigree?
The main reasons lie in the difference in attitudes towards the
objectives of competition policy on the two side of the Atlantic.
In the United States, antitrust law has always had the purpose of
encouraging allocative and productive economic efficiency,
resulting ultimately in benefits to consumers. Judge Posner has
stated that "[s]ince efficiency is an important, although not the
only, social value, this conclusion establishes a prima facie case
for having an antitrust policy." 9 Judge Easterbrook puts it more
elegantly: "The goal of antitrust is to perfect the operation of
competitive markets."'" These views form the "Chicago School"
of antitrust economic analysis.
87 Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 375 (7th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 934 (1987).
88 Mark Furse, The 'Essential Facilities' Doctrine in Community Law, [1995] 8
ECLR 469, 472.
89 Derek Ridyard, Essential Facilities and the Obligation to Supply Competitors
Under UK and EC Competition Law, [1996] 8 ECLR 438.
90 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANITrRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 4 (1976),
quoted in Fred S. McChesney, Be True to Your School: Chicago's Contradictory Views
of Antitrust and Regulation, in CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC
CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 323, 329 (Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart II, eds.,
1995).
91 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1984)
quoted in CAUSES & CONSEQUENCES, supra note 90.
9 The Chicago School's analysis is based on several premises. First, economic
efficiency, specifically allocative efficiency, is paramount.
Second, most markets are competitive. Third, monopoly tends to be self-
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The goals of the competition rules in the EC, however, are
multiple. Article 2 of the EC Treaty defines the task of the
Community as implementing the policies referred to in Article 3
and 3a93 to promote "a harmonious and balanced development of
economic activities ... a high degree of convergence of economic
performance, a high level of employment and of social protection,
the rising of the standard of living and quality of life, and
economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member
States."'94
The EU's Competition Commissioner has said that "[t]he aims
of the European Community's competition policy are economic,
political and social. The policy is concerned not only with
promoting efficient production but also achieving the aims of the
European treaties ... promoting harmonious growth [and] raising
living standards." 9'
Because of these different emphases, EC competition law
differs from American antitrust law in its application and analysis.
For example, under the Sherman Act section 2, monopoly power is
not normally found unless there is a market share of two-thirds of
the relevant market,96 with a spectrum of uncertainty between forty
percent and sixty percent."7 In contrast, the market share upon
which "dominance" is found in the EU is fifty percent, and in
correcting because the monopolist's higher profits attract new entrants into the
monopolist's market. Fourth, most business firms are profit maximizers. Fifth,
antitrust enforcement should operate to penalize conduct precisely to the point
that it is inefficient, but to tolerate or encourage it when it is efficient. Sixth,
normally barriers to entry are low or non-existent over the long term.
Per Jebsen & Robert Stevens, Assumptions, Goals and Dominant Undertakings: The
Regulation of Competition under Article 86 of the European Union, 64 ANTITRUST L.J.
443, 456 (1995-96).
93 Article 3(g) refers to '"a system ensuring that competition in the internal market
is not distorted," while there is a reference in Article 3a to an "open market economy
with free competition." EC TREATY art. 3a(l). Articles 85 and 86 are the main
instruments by which these particular objectives are to be attained.
94 Id. art. 2 (emphasis added).
95 Commissioner Karel Van Miert, Frontier-Free Europe (May 5, 1993), quoted in
Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 92, at 449.
96 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 482
(1992).
97 See Spectrum Sport, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 453,454 (1993).
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some cases, less than that.98
Under American antitrust law, a monopolist is immune from
liability where it owes its monopoly to "natural advantages
(including accessibility to raw materials and markets) [and]
economic or technological efficiency (including scientific
research)."' '  A European undertaking in those same
circumstances, however, may be held to be in a position of
dominance. In Hoffman-La Roche v. Commission,"'° for example,
technological superiority was a factor that helped to establish
dominance."0 2 Thus, it has been suggested that the European
Union feels the need to protect both competition and
competitors, 103 even though the Commission has, in the DraftNotice, stated that "Community law protects competition and not
competitors. ' 04
In any event, it seems clear that the strict doctrinal rules that
dominate U.S. antitrust proceedings 5 and the concerns over the
potential breadth of the essential facilities doctrine may not be of
98 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
9 Assuming, of course, that the monopolist takes no improper steps to maintain
the monopoly.
100 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass.
1953), aff'dper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
101 Case 85/76, 1979 E.C.R. 461.
102 See Case 6/72, Europemballage Corp. v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 207. The
ECJ seemed to place emphasis on the fact that Continental Can had superior access to
the international financial markets.
103 See Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 92, at 493. It is also worth noting that while
section 2 of the Sherman Act is concerned with the manner in which firms unlawfully
obtain or maintain monopoly power, Article 86 of the EC Treaty controls the
exploitation of monopoly power. See EC TREATY art. 86.
104 Draft Notice, supra note 31 n. 58.
105 The rules applied in American antitrust law reflect the need to protect the "rule
of the marketplace;" an efficient firm should not be penalized for capturing unsatisfied
customers from an inefficient rival, whose ability to compete may suffer as a result. As
the Supreme Court noted in Copperweld,
because it is sometimes difficult to distinguish robust competition from conduct
with anticompetitive effects, Congress authorized Sherman Act scrutiny of
single firms only when they pose a danger of monopolization. Judging
unilateral conduct in this manner reduces the risk that the antitrust laws will
dampen the competitive zeal of a single aggressive entrepreneur.
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-68 (1984).
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such great importance in Europe.
Finally, a comprehensive study of the doctrine in the European
context 0°6 has noted that in Europe, dominant state-owned
companies, as instruments of national or industrial policy, are
more likely to refuse to deal for protectionist reasons than private
companies in the United States. These regulated or state-owned
companies often own facilities that are essential for their own
downstream operations. Thus, it may be said that "[t]he essential
facilities principle is, in effect, the follow-up of Article 90 of the
EC Treaty."'' 7
In the EU, the doctrine developed out of the early "refusal to
supply" cases, analyzed under Article 86 of the EC Treaty. For
example, in Commercial Solvents v. Commission"0 8 ("Commercial
Solvents"), the ECJ held that Commercial Solvents, as the sole
producer of aminobutanol, abused its dominant position when the
company refused to supply the product to Zoja, a competitor, for
the manufacture of derivatives. The ECJ held that
an undertaking which has a dominant position in the market in
raw materials and which, with the object of reserving such raw
material for manufacturing its own derivatives, refuses to
supply a customer, which is itself a manufacturer of these
derivatives, and therefore risks eliminating all competition on
the part of this customer, is abusing its dominant position within
the meaning of Article 86.'°'
In B&I Line v. Sealink,"' Sealink-Stena owned Holyhead
Harbour and operated a car ferry. B&I was a competing car ferry
"I See Lang, supra note 77.
107 Id. at 483.
108 Joined Cases 6 and 7/73, Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA & Commercial
Solvents v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 223. This case is of a similar breed to Liptons v.
Hugins, where the Commission found an abuse of a dominant position where a
dominant undertaking with a monopoly refused to supply its products to existing
customers and this refusal would ultimately prevent them from carrying out a particular
line of business. See Commission Decision EEC 78/68, Liptons v. Hugins
Kassaregister, O.J. (L22/23) 22/32-3 (1978); on appeal Case 22/78 Hugin Kassaregister
v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 1869; see also Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission,
1978 E.C.R. 207.
109 Commercial Solvents, 1974 E.C.R. at 251.
110 [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 255.
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operator. By changing the port's ferry schedules, Sealink was able
to disrupt B&I's ferry operations. The Commission held that
because the central corridor of ferry journeys between Great
Britain and Ireland formed the relevant market and Holyhead was
the only available port in that market, Holyhead was an "essential
facility."''. This division marks the first explicit use of the term in
EC competition law."2 The Commission stated that a dominant'
undertaking that owns, controls, and uses an essential facility and
places competitors at a disadvantage by refusing competitors
access to that facility or granting access only on terms less
favorable than those which it gives its own services, infringes
Article 86."' The Commission ordered Sealink to provide port
facilities to B&I on conditions no more or less favorable than
those given to its own customers."'
4
While Commercial Solvents and B&I involved existing
competitors, the Commission's attitude toward situations
involving new or potential competitors is more relevant in the
present analysis. As will be seen in the discussion of the doctrine
as utilized in the Draft Notice, the full potential of the doctrine and
potential difficulties lie with this issue.
In Sea Containers v. Stena Sealink,"5 Sea Containers wanted to
start a new high-speed service on the same central corridor route
between Great Britain and Ireland as in B&L The Commission
ordered Sealink to provide port facilities to Sea Containers on
conditions no more or less favorable than those given to its own
services." 6 The Commission made it clear that the principle
applied in B&I also "applies when the competitor seeking access
to the essential facility is a new entrant into the relevant market."" 7
" See id. at 264-66. An "essential facility" is a facility or infrastructure required by
competitors to provide services to customers. See id.
112 See id. at 265. The Commission cited Commercial Solvents and other relevant
cases as authorities for the doctrine. See id. at 266.
"3 See id. at 265.
"14 See id. at 271.
"5 Commission Decision No. 94/19/EC, 1994 O.J. (L 15/8).
116 See id. at 16.
17 Id. at 17.
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In the Port of Rodby,"8 the Commission held that the refusal
by the Danish Minister for Transport to allow Stena to access the
facilities at Rodby strengthened the dominant position of the
Danish Railway (DSB) as the port authority of Rdby."9 The
Commission found that the port was an essential facility, a facility
or infrastructure without which competitors would be unable to
offer their services to customers.'20 The Commission decided that
the refusal to grant a ship owner that wanted to operate on the
same maritime route access to that essential facility would infringe
Article 86. 121
The ECJ's most recent pronouncement on the applicability of
the essential facilities doctrine in EC competition law came in RTE
& ITP v. Commission.22 The ECJ, like the Commission and the
Court of First Instance ("CFI"), decided that TV listings were an
essential facility in the publication of weekly television guides.
Accordingly, the BBC and ITP could not refuse to grant licenses
to publish their listings. 2 1 While the exact scope of the essential
facilities doctrine in the realm of intellectual property rights is not
entirely clear, 24 the significance of RTP & ITE' lies in the ECJ's
willingness to adopt and apply the doctrine as an integral part of
EC law.
In the telecommunications context, there is good reason for the
acceptance of the essential facilities doctrine. At least in the
American context, Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp have
suggested that the doctrine should at most extend to facilities that
are a natural monopoly, once regulated monopoly utilities, and
perhaps those large projects, like sports arenas, that are publicly
118 Commission Decision No. 94/119/EEC, 1994 O.J. (L 55/52).
119 See id.; see also British Midlands-Aer Lingus, Commission Decision No.
92/213/EEC, 1992 O.J. (L 96/34, 96/40).
120 See Commission Decision No. 94/119/EEC, 1994 O.J. at 54.
12 The case was actually decided on Article 90(1), since the refusal came from the
Member State.
122 Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743, 808. These cases
involved intellectual property rights. See id.
123 See id. at 764.
124 Intellectual property rights are by their nature exclusive. However, this does not
assume that the owner of those rights is in a dominant position for Article 86 purposes.
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subsidized and thus could not be built privately.2' Because state
promotion of public natural monopolies in telecommunications,
not economic or technological efficiency, gave the TOs in Europe
control over such facilities, telecommunications cases may require
the application of the essential facilities doctrine.
Since the publication of the Telecommunications Guidelines in
199 1, the Commission has clearly taken the position that a refusal
to supply is an abuse of dominant position.'26 While that was
consistent with the reserved rights afforded to the TOs at that time,
a general obligation is placed on the TOs to provide access to
essential facilities to new entrants.
(i) The Doctrine in the Draft Notice
The Draft Notice defines an "essential facility" in the
European telecommunications context as "a facility or
infrastructure which is essential for reaching customers and/or
enabling competitors to carry on their business, and which cannot
be replicated by any reasonable means."'2 Examples given include
the "public telecommunications networks for voice and/or data
services, leased circuit [and/or] related network terminating
equipment, basic data regarding subscribers to the public voice
telephony service, numbering schemes, and other customer or
technical information.'
28
According to the Draft Notice, a refusal to grant access to an
essential facility will only be considered abusive if it "affects
competition. ' Because the services markets will initially contain
"few competitive players, refusals will generally affect
competition" in those markets.3 '
The Commission has identified three possible scenarios for the
application of the essential facilities doctrine. 3' First, there may
125 See ARnEDA & HOVENCAMP, supra note 85, 772.
126 See Telecommunications Guidelines, supra note 32, at 18-19. The Commission
cites Commercial Solvents and United Brands. See id.
127 Draft Notice, supra note 31, at 18-19.
128 Id.
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be a refusal to grant access for the purposes of a service "where
another operator has been given access by the access provider to
operate on that services market." ' This refers to the situation
where an existing company and the incumbent TO essentially
compete in the same services market. The TO in question would
have a duty to provide access to the competing company in the
downstream market on terms "no less favorable than those given
to other parties, including its own corresponding downstream
operations.""' However, enforcement is difficult due to problems
of generating accurate internal transfer pricing. The TO may
conceivably argue that it faces an overly large burden.
Second, a TO may refuse to grant access to a new entrant who
wishes to operate in a new, related services market. "4 This is most
likely to occur in the first phase of full liberalization after January
1, 1998. In essence the scenario is very much like the one faced in
Sea Containers. '3 The Commission cites cases in the transport
field, including Sea Containers v. Sealink and Port of Rodby, and
states that principles applied in those cases apply in the
telecommunications sector as well. 36 This second situation also
anticipates the possibility, given rapid technological changes in the
sector, that new entrants may want to provide new services or
products that are not in competition with those offered by the
dominant TO, but for which the TO is reluctant to provide access.
If there are no commercially feasible alternatives to the access
being requested, then a refusal by the incumbent TO to grant
access would contravene Article 86: "in particular, a company may
abuse its dominant position if its actions prevent the emergence of
a new product or service."'37 Even under the arguably more narrow
rationale of American antitrust principles, such refusal promotes
inefficiency in the market through a reduction in output and a
reduction in consumer choice.
132 Id. B&ILine illustrates this scenario.
1 Id.
134 See id.
135 Commission Decision 94/14, 1994 O.J. (L 16) 8.
136 See Draft Notice, supra note 31, at 21, 30 n.56, 57. See generally Joined Cases
C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, RTE & ITP v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743, 808.
137 Draft Notice, supra note 3 1, at 22.
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In assessing whether there is a breach of Article 86 under this
second situation, the Commission considers whether (1) there is
sufficient capacity available to provide access; (2) the facility
owner fails to satisfy demand on an existing market and blocks the
emergence of a potential new service or product; (3) the company
seeking access is prepared to pay a reasonable and non-
discriminatory price for access; (4) there is no objective
justification for refusing to provide access;13 and (5) access to the
facility is "generally essential" in order for the new entrant to
compete in that related market. 39 This last factor will probably
result in the most contention. The question will be, "What is
essential"? In the Draft Notice the Commission states that refusal
of access must make the proposed activities "either impossible or
seriously and unavoidably uneconomic."' 4  Furthermore, the
Commission also states that it "will not be sufficient that the
position of the new entrant would be more advantageous if access
were granted.' 4' This phrase seems to contradict opinion that
analysis should stem from the side of the facility owner, and not
the competitor. 141 One possible explanation for this position is that
the new entrant will be arguing that a particular facility is
"essential."
Still, the issue of access should be determined by deciding
whether a dominant facility owner, by refusing access to an
essential facility, is in breach of Article 86. The question should
address the level of advantage the facility owner should be allowed
to maintain over its competitors. A breach of Article 86 should
138 Relevant justifications would include an overriding difficulty of providing
access. The justifications will be examined on a case-by-case basis. See id.
139 See id. Apart from these five factors, the Commission has also stated that in the
determination of abuse of dominance it will consider undue and unexplained delays in
responding for requests to access, the refusal to grant interconnection at the "most
suitable point" for the requesting party, and excessive pricing for access. See id. at 23.
140 Id. at 22.
141 Id.
142 Consider, for example, Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp's suggestion that the
essential facilities doctrine should at most extend to natural monopolies. Otherwise,
competitors could claim that any desired facility is "essential" as long as it gives "its
possessor a substantial cost advantage over rivals or new entrants," even if that
advantage has been obtained through superior skill or effort. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 85.
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only occur with a refusal to supply beyond that point of advantage.
Factors such as the facility owner's market share would be
important.'43 The Commission states that "[c]ommunity law
protects competition and not competitors. '" However, as
suggested earlier, the European approach in practice may focus
more on the position of the competitor.'45
New entrants should not be able to force the TO to allow
access merely by claiming that the dominant TO is in control of
some necessary facility. This result would reduce incentives to
superior performance, a concern which is addressed in the
following sections.
The third possible scenario identified by the Commission in
the Draft Notice relates to a withdrawal of access from an existing
customer.' This is the Commercial Solvents situation. The
Commission notes that although Commercial Solvents dealt with
the withdrawal of a product, "there is no difference in principle
between this case and the withdrawal of access."'
4
(ii) Problems with the Doctrine in the
Telecommunications Context
While it is clear that the Commission has embraced the
essential facilities doctrine in its competition decisions, the precise
scope of its application remains unclear. As discussed above,
questions remain as to what constitutes "essentiality.', 49 The
Commission has compiled the existing case law on Article 86 that
may relate to the issue of access to essential facilities. Since it is
uncertain, however, whether the ECJ will apply the case law, the
Commission has probably acted wisely in using a non-binding
Draft Notice. At least the Draft Notice has given a strong
indication that the Commission accepts the essential facilities
143 Low market share may imply that there could be other options in the market for
that facility.
1' Draft Notice, supra note 31, at 30.
145 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
14 See Draft Notice, supra note 31, at 21.
147 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
148 Draft Notice, supra note 31, at 23.
149 See supra p. 28.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
doctrine and intends to apply it to issues of rights of access.
Parties involved should be able to develop a sense of the
Commission's attitude without needing to analyze an entire body
of case law to guess the Commission's stand.
Important concerns also exist regarding the delicate balance
that must be maintained between the need to introduce competition
into the sector, via interconnection, and the need to maintain
incentives to invest in innovation. Of course, in the case of the
European technological sector, neither skill, technological
innovation nor efficiency necessarily resulted in the creation of
such "essential" assets. To a large extent, the essentiality of these
assets is attributable to the fact that the TOs were public/natural
monopolies. The problem lies in assessing how large a role each
factor plays in the creation of essential assets.
In point 79 of the Draft Notice, the Commission recognizes
that although alternative infrastructures may be used for liberalized
services beginning July 1, 1996, such an alternative infrastructure
does not "at present" offer the same dense geographic coverage as
that of the incumbent TOs.'5 ° How long will the Commission view
the TOs' infrastructures as "essential?" Because the EU's concern
with competition is arguably broader in scope than the American
antitrust rationale of pure economic efficiency, there is a danger
that new entrants may try to take advantage of the doctrine for as
long as possible. Therefore, there may not be the same incentives
to innovate as there might be if the competitors were forced to
compete purely on an economic basis. For example, new entrants
will now have little incentive to risk large amounts of capital to
duplicate the infrastructure that the TOs presently control. In many
ways, innovation and research for cheaper telephone services,
which would ultimately benefit the consumers, will not be
encouraged if the threshold requirements for the operation of the
essential facilities doctrine are too low.'
150 See Draft Notice, supra note 31, at 22.
151 The Commission is aware of the potential problems regarding investment
incentives. "The critical factor is creating the optimal incentives for investing by sending
out the right signals to the market. Upstream, an ideal pricing policy would be one
which resulted in a clear recognition of the natural bottlenecks, and an economically
viable bypass of others." Ungerer, supra note 5. New regulations in Spain, for example,
will require the new competitor, Retevision (the incumbent TO being Telefonica), to
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In order to determine whether the duplication of the
infrastructure is economically feasible for the new entrant, the new
entrants' investment in duplication must be determined before
requiring the incumbent TO to provide access." This may not be
too difficult in the initial stages of liberalization, because the TOs
currently own the entire infrastructure. However, as multiple
infrastructures develop over time, the calculation will become
more complicated. The determination is made all the more
complicated by multiple factors. Technological change in the
telecommunications industry is rapid. In addition, the ways in
which competitors may duplicate portions of the facility, and the
access points to the facility, may change frequently.
5 3
(b) Other Forms of Abuse
Apart from refusals by TOs to provide access, the Draft Notice
also anticipates abuses that may arise where access has been
granted.
(i) Network Configuration
A dominant TO may configure its network to make access
objectively more difficult for service providers. 54 The Commission
could find abuse based on the traditional Article 86 principle
prohibiting discrimination.
(ii) Tying
The dominant TO may require the party requesting access to
purchase one or more services without adequate justification.'55
This situation, called "tying," is clearly prohibited by Article
create an alternative infrastructure to the Telefonica network; Retevision is expected to
have at least one switching center in each province by July 1998. See Spain Sets
Interconnection Tariffs, TECH EUR., Apr. 5, 1997, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
Eurtech File; also available in 1997 WL 8652069.
152 See Stephen A. Pomerantz, Recent Antitrust Developments and a Selective
Antitrust Perspective of the Information Superhighway, 64 FoRDHAM L. REv. 808, 822
(1995), citing Alan L. Silverstein, Essential Facilities and Refusals to Deal in Network
Industries Facing Rapid Technological Change, ANTITRUST REP., Sept. 1995, at 3, 3-8.
1 See id. at 823.
154 See Draft Notice, supra note 31, at 23.
155 See id.
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86(d). The application of this principle to the telecommunications
sector in terms of access and interconnection should not differ
from the traditional analysis of the concept.156
The classic "tying" practice in the telecommunications context
is the "bundling" of services. For example, the TO may require a
party needing only national access to accept a tariff for
interconnection that includes an international carriage component
for message conveyance."
This issue of "bundled access" is dealt with under the ONP
framework and is discussed below in the discussion on the
Interconnection Directive.158
(iii) Pricing",
TOs wishing to maintain a dominant position can use two
possible tactics: excessively high pricing and unfairly low pricing.
Either, if established, would violate Article 86(a).W It should be
remembered that a TO, as a monopolist, can significantly
influence the costs of a new competitor by manipulating
interconnection charges.
In United Brands v. Commission,'61 the ECJ laid down a
possible standard for what would be considered excess pricing:
[C]harging a price which is excessive because it has no
reasonable relation to the economic value of the product
supplied may be [an abuse of the dominant position within the
156 See, e.g., Case T-30/89, Hilti AG v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. 11-1439 (noting
Commission decision that Hilti, which produced nail guns, cartridges and nails, abused
its dominant position by forcing customers to either buy the cartridge strips together
with nails, or buy the cartridges alone for a higher price).
157 See COUDERT BROS., supra note 38, at 118.
158 See infra note 251 and accompanying text.
159 The issue of considering universal service obligations in the determination, in
particular, of excessive pricing, forms a separate analysis that will not be discussed here.
Article 5 of the Interconnection Directive provides rules upon which a mechanism for
sharing the net cost of universal service, if needed, may be established. See
Interconnection Directive, supra note 36, art. 5, at 37.
160 See EC TREATY, art. 86(a). "[D]irectly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or
selling prices or other unfair trading conditions" is an example of abuse of dominant
position under Article 86(a). Id.
161 Case 27/76, 1978 E.C.R. 207.
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meaning of subparagraph (a) of Article 86]. This excess could,
inter alia, be determined objectively if it were possible for it to
be calculated by making a comparison between the selling price
of the product in question and its cost of production, which
would disclose the amount of the profit margin .... 62
The ECJ, however, indicated that "other ways may be devised
... of selecting the rules for determining whether the price of a
product is unfair. 1 63 The ECJ and the Commission have not,
however, successfully constructed a consistent test for the
determination of "excessive pricing."'" The simple cost-based test
suggested by the ECJ in United Brands is hardly satisfactory,
because it leaves open the question of how large a profit margin
should be allowed. Further, in interconnection pricing there are
several different cost elements that may be considered, such as
embedded costs, joint costs, incremental costs, and common costs.
Thus, the idea of a "cost-based" test is much more complicated
than that necessitated by the situation in United Brands v.
Commission."'
Further, the fact that the "production costs" of the TO were
incurred at a time when there was no competition to ensure
economic efficiency also makes the computation of such costs
more difficult. In cases like Ministare Public v. Tournier,66 the
ECJ used a comparative approach, which amounted to examining
comparable charges levied by comparable copyright collecting
societies in other Member States.6 7 In theory, this approach would
enable the adjudicating body, such as the Commission or the ECJ,
to exclude costs incurred because of the dominant undertaking's
162 Id. at 209 (noting that the ECJ annulled the Commission's decision because the
commission adduced adequate proof of the analysis of the cost structure of United
Brands in declaring that United Brands infringed Article 86 by charging excessive
prices).
163 Id. at 302.
16 See Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 92; COUDERT BROS., supra note 38, at 107-
112.
165 The Commission does not seem to have used this cost-based test very much to
challenge allegedly excessive prices.
'6 Case 395/87, 1989 E.C.R. 2521.
167 See also Case 226/84, British Leyland Public Co. v. Commission, 1986 E.C.R.
3263; Case 26/75, General Motors v. Commission, 1975 E.C.R. 1367.
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own inefficiencies. However, such comparison does not ensure
certainty, particularly in interconnection, since there must be some
consistent basis for calculating interconnection charges applicable
in all the Member States.
To that end, the Interconnection Directive aims to provide a
much-needed computational basis. 68 In Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen
v. Zentrale zur Bekdmpfung Unlauteren Wettbewerbs, 69 the ECJ
posited that in determining tariff principles, which are set out in a
Community directive, criteria can be used interpretively to
determine if undertakings affected by the directive charge
"excessive" rates.' 70 This implies that the pricing rules set out in
the Interconnection Directive (a Council Directive) that are not
based on competition rules per se, may be considered for
interpreting excessive pricing under Article 86. 171
As for unfairly low or "predatory" pricing, the text of the Draft
Notice indicates that the Commission has accepted the test set out
in AKZO v. Commission. 7' Thus, "[i]n general, a price is abusive
if it is below the dominant company's average variable costs or if
it is below average total costs and part of an anti-competitive
168 In the United Kingdom, the telecommunications industry has been liberalized
since 1984. The latest development in the regulation of interconnection charges is that
under some new proposals, British Telecom (BT) will have the right to set the charge
itself, subject to rules depending on the competitiveness of the service concerned. BT
will be able to price competitive interconnection services subject to the generally
applicable conditions of its license: "RPI + 0%" (where RPI is the Retail Price Index),
safeguard caps to protect against excessive pricing of interconnection services that are
expected to become competitive during the lifetime of the controls, and the "RPI - V
formulae applied to those interconnection services that will not be competitive during
the lifetime of the controls. See Greater Pricing Freedom for BT, EuR.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Jan. 10, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8803496. For a detailed
consideration of what such a proposal would amount to and a thorough analysis of the
"X" factor in the "RPI - X" formula, see ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT, PRICE CAPS FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS: POLICIES AND EXPERIENCES
(1995).
169 Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen v. Zentrale zur BekAmpfung Unlauteren
Wettbewerbs, 1989 E.C.R. 803.
170 See COUDERT BROS., supra note 38, at 110.
171 The Directive is based on ONP principles rather than EC competition rules on
the interplay between ONP and the competition rules. See supra notes 1-7 and
accompanying text.
172 Case C-62/86, AKZO v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. 1-3359.
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plan.'1 3 The rationale for the first prong of the test is that an
undertaking in a dominant position has no interest in applying
prices below average variable costs except to eliminate
competitors and subsequently to raise prices. 74 Application of such
prices will generate a loss, namely, the total amount of fixed costs
and at least part of the variable costs relating to the unit produced.
As for the second prong, prices below average total costs which
are part of an average cost plan can exclude from the market
companies that may operate as efficiently as the dominant TO but
maintain lower financial capacity and cannot compete with such
predatory pricing.'
5
Predatory pricing may arise in another context. A dominant
TO may also charge unfairly low prices for access in order to
eliminate competition from emerging infrastructure providers. The
focus is, thus, not on the rights of a new entrant desiring access to
an incumbent TO's infrastructure, but on the rights of a rival
infrastructure provider.
The Commission recognizes that the average variable cost rule
cannot be applied in many situations in the telecommunications
sector, since the variable costs of providing access to an already
existing network are almost zero.7 6 Therefore, the Commission is
considering a test that seems to fall between the two prongs of the
AKZO test. 7 Even where there is no intent to exclude a
competitor, a dominant TO can be held to have priced predatorily.
If the price of a good is below the average total cost of producing
the good on a continuing basis, a TO may be held liable for
predatory pricing. This rule applies even when the price of the
good exceeds the average variable cost of producing that good.
171
The Interconnection Directive deals mainly with the needs of
173 Draft Notice, supra note 31, at 24. In AKZO v. Commission, the ECJ defined
variable costs as those that vary depending on the quantities produced and defined fixed
costs as those which remain constant regardless of the quantities produced. AKZO, 1991
E.C.R. 1-3455.
174 See AKZO, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-3372.
'I See id. at 3455-56.
176 See Draft Notice, supra note 31, at 24.
177 See id.
178 See id. at 30 n.66.
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new entrants who need to access the incumbent TO's
infrastructure. However, the provisions as to transparency and
account separation" effectively monitor the pricing practices of
the TOs that may affect competing infrastructure providers.
(iv) Discrimination
A TO may apply "dissimilar conditions to equivalent
transactions"''80 as among new entrants desiring access to that TO's
infrastructure, or as between new entrants and the TO itself in the
secondary market. The Draft Notice notes that such
discrimination may take the form of price discrimination in terms
of different charges for interconnection, "delays, technical181
access, routing, numbering, restrictions on network use
exceeding essential requirements and use of customer network
data."'' 2  The analysis of alleged differential treatment will be
taken on a case-by-case basis.' As with the other requirements set
out in the Draft Notice, there may be objective justifications for
discrimination."
Since interconnection arrangements are likely to result from
commercial negotiations rather than NRA direction, individual
agreements between the TO and the parties obtaining access are
likely to be very party-specific and complex. As such, comparing
the terms of two different access agreements to determine if
"discrimination" exists will be a very difficult task. These
difficulties, however, may be alleviated by the fact that the TOs in
all the Member States must publish the standard terms and
conditions of access by July 1, 1997.s Further, all interconnection
179 See Interconnection Directive, supra note 36, art. 8, at 39.
180 EC TREATY, art. 85(d).
181 See Draft Notice, supra note 31, at 24. Technical access discrimination would
include the level of technical sophistication of the access, the number and/or location of
connection points, and the ability of the new entrant's customers to obtain services
provided by the incumbent TO by using the same number of dial digits. See id. at 25.
182 Id. at 24.
183 See id.
'8 "These could include factors relating to the actual operation of the network
owned by the access provider, or licensing restrictions consistent with, for example, the
subject matter of intellectual property rights." Id. at 25.
185 See Full Competition Directive, supra note 8, at 23.
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agreements must be communicated to the relevant NRA.1 6 This
will at least give the adjudicating body a basis from which to start
the discrimination analysis.
There is generally more transparency to the whole process of
producing interconnection agreements. Thus, discrimination
analysis may be easier in the interconnection area. However, as
Dr. Ungerer has indicated, as the relevant markets become more
competitive, standard tariffs and uniform pricing rules may be
relaxed in favor of increasing price flexibility for competing
operators. "Unfair discrimination by dominant operators will
always be an offence but a degree of discrimination based on real
differences in demand and objective costs should ultimately be
allowed for."' 87
B. Analysis of Access and Interconnection Agreements Under
Article 85
Considering the state of the telecommunications sector, access
agreements 88 can have significant pro-competitive effects. Such
agreements form the basis for the "interoperability of services and
infrastructure, thus increasing competition in the downstream
market for services, which is likely to involve higher added value
than local infrastructure."'89 That does not mean, however, that no
Article 85(1) concerns exist.'9 The Commission has identified
186 See Interconnection Directive, supra note 36, art. 6(c), at 38. "It should be
noted, however, that notification of an agreement to an NRA does not make notification
to the Commission unnecessary. The NRA must ensure that actions taken by them are
consistent EC competition law." Draft Notice, supra note 31, at 13. They must not
approve arrangements which are contrary to the competition rules, as the Member State
may be liable in damages to those harmed. See id.
187 Ungerer, supra note 5; see also Interconnection Directive, supra note 36, art.
7.3, at 38.
188 The Commission's reference to "access agreements" is really that of
interconnection agreements; in this section the two terms are used interchangeably. To
avoid confusion, the Commission should consider adopting the same term as that used in
the Interconnection Directive.
189 Draft Notice, supra note 31, at 25.
190 Access agreements are generally outside the scope of the Merger Regulation
(Council Regulation 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings)
because they do not result in the creation of a distinct and autonomous entity. See id. at
13.
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four possible anti-competitive effects which may arise out of
interconnection agreements, namely, that they may: (1) serve as a
means of coordinating prices; (2) serve as a means of market
sharing; (3) have exclusionary effects on third parties; and (4) lead
to an exchange of commercially sensitive information between the
parties.'9' Generally, the more symmetric and reciprocal the
relationship between interconnecting parties, the greater the need
for monitoring the danger of collusion. 19
2
1. Risk of Price Coordination'
The Commission has always considered price agreements
among the most serious infringements of Article 85(1). 9' Because
interconnection charges often amount to fifty percent or more of
the total cost of services provided, the scope of price competition
is quite limited. Thus, a TO and new entrant may synchronize their
cost structures and fix the prices of services for which they
compete. During the early stages of liberalization when there are
few competitors in the telecommunications sector, there is a
concern that a duopoly or oligopoly situation may arise. Hence, an
agreement on artificially high interconnection charges may arise,
which has the dual effect of creating higher prices for consumers
and providing a difficult basis for assessing the presence of
discriminatory pricing.9 The Commission intends to "pay
particular attention to scrutinizing access agreements in the
context of their likely effects on the relevant markets in order to
ensure that such agreements do not serve as indirect means for
fixing and coordinating end-prices for end-users."'96
The Interconnection Directive deals with this problem to a
certain extent by requiring that all interconnection agreements are
191 See id.
192 See WIK, NETWORK INTERCONNECTION IN THE DOMAIN OF ONP-STuDY FOR DG
XIII OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT (1994), cited in COUDERT BROS.,
supra note 38, at 123. Conversely, "the more asymmetric the relationship between
interconnecting parties, the more need there is for direct regulatory intervention." Id.
193 See EC TREATY, art. 85.
194 See Telecommunications Guidelines, supra note 32, at 10.
195 See COUDERT BROS., supra note 38, at 124.
196 Draft Notice, supra note 31, at 26.
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to be communicated to the relevant NRA and made available on
request to interested parties with the exception of those parts
which deal with the commercial strategy of the parties. 9' The cost
accounting systems used would be subject to scrutiny by the
NRA. 98
2. Market Sharing
The Commission provides scant comments in the Draft Notice
on the concern of market sharing. 99 However, the usual Article 85
case law on collusion would be applicable here, since the concept
of market sharing is not one that has unique features in terms of
access agreements.2° Thus, the aim would simply be to ensure the
emergence of network competition, as opposed to a sharing of the
market between the TO and the new entrant.
3. Exclusionary Effect on Third Parties
Third parties requesting access may suffer discrimination,
particularly regarding price ' and quality.2"2 The publication of
each TO's standard terms and conditions of access by July 1,
199723 should address this concern. Moreover, the
Interconnection Directive's provisions relating to transparency of
proceedings in interconnection agreements should further frustrate
efforts to discriminate between new entrants.
4. Exchange of Sensitive Information
Arrangements between undertakings for interconnection
necessarily involve exchanges of commercially sensitive
information. For example, to determine the scope of the
agreement or the relevant interconnection charge, there must be
197 See Interconnection Directive, supra note 36, art. 6(c), at 38.
198 The observations made in relation to the control mechanisms in the
Interconnection Directive against excessive pricing also apply here.
199 See Draft Notice, supra note 31, at 26.
200 See EC TREATY, art. 85.
201 The discussion above on discriminatory pricing in relation to Article 86 is
relevant here as well. See id. art. 85(c).
202 See id. art. 85(d).
203 See Full Competition Directive, supra note 8, at 23.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
some consideration of the undertaking's intended geographic
coverage and perhaps the intended current and future investments
for expansion purposes.2 °4 Such information can "influence the
competitive behavior of the undertakings concerned" and facilitate
interdependence." 5 The Draft Notice observes that this may result
in "collusive practices, such as market sharing."'2 °
While the Commission's stand regarding exchanges of price
information was considered almost twenty years ago in Suiker
Unie v. Commission,"7 the legality of exchanges of non-price
information was considered only recently by the CFI in John
Deere v. Commission,"' which involved an oligopoly; the
exchange of information did not directly concern prices and did
not underpin a cartel or other anticompetitive agreement. The CFI
agreed with the Commission that the information exchange
agreement was caught by Article 85(1) because the information
exchange (1) disadvantaged non-member competitors, (2)
produced potential anticompetitive effects among members, and
(3) made it possible for each participating manufacturer to monitor
its dealers' sales and thus made it possible for the manufacturers to
"confer absolute territorial protection on each of their dealers. '0 9
John Deere marks the first occasion where the Commission
clearly stated that information exchanges of non-price information
would be prohibited under certain circumstances. It indicates the
Commission's concern about the exchange of sensitive
information between actual or potential competitors, especially
where the market'is concentrated, and is a good indication of how
the Commission will, deal with information exchanges between
TOs and new entrants."'
204 See Draft Notice, supra note 31, at 26.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Joined Cases 40-48, 50, 54-56, 111, 113, & 114/73, Suiker Unie and Ors v.
Commission, 1975 E.C.R. 1663.
208 Case T-35/92, John Deere Ltd. v. Commission, 1994, E.C.R. 11-957.
209 Id. 96.
210 Although some other outcome would be quite unlikely, the Commission reminds
all undertakings that access agreements that have been concluded with an
anticompetitive object are "extremely unlikely to fulfill the criteria for an individual
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C. Conclusion on Articles 85 and 86
The Draft Notice serves as a basic guide to the Commission's
expectations in the application of the EC's competition rules.
Certain issues still need to be resolved, but resolution can only
occur as more experience is gained in this area. Therefore, the
case-by-case approach is probably best.
If access has been granted by the incumbent TO, a remaining
issue concerns what rules should apply as to the mechanics of
interconnection and interoperability with such access. The
Council and Parliament's Interconnection Directive aims to
address this issue.2" '
V. The Regulation of the Terms and Conditions of
Interconnection Agreements
A. The Interconnection Directive
A variety of issues arise under the terms and conditions of
interconnection agreements.212 First, to what extent should the TO
and the new entrant be free to negotiate interconnection
agreements? Second, what economic and accounting principles
should be applied in the pricing of interconnection charges?
Third, what are the responsibilities of the NRAs in the regulation
of these agreements, in particular, with regard to dispute
resolution? Fourth, how much collocation and facility-sharing are
the TOs expected to allow? Fifth, what should be done about
number portability?
Article 1 of the Interconnection Directive states that the
Directive "concerns the harmonization of conditions for open and
efficient interconnection2  of and access to public
exemption under Article 85(3)." Draft Notice, supra note 31, at 26.
211 See Interconnection Directive, supra note 36, pmbl., at 32-36.
212 The issue of directory services is provided for in the Full Competition Directive
which requires Member States to ensure "all exclusive rights with regard to the
establishment and provision of directory services, including both the publication of
directories and directory enquiry services, on their territory are lifted." Full Competition
Directive, supra note 8, at 23.
213 The definition of "interconnection" in this Interconnection Directive differs
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telecommunications networks 14  and publicly available
telecommunications services." 215  The central thrust of the
Interconnection Directive, therefore, is to require TOs with
"significant market power" to "meet all reasonable requests for
access to the network including access at points other than the
network termination points offered to the majority of end-users. ' 216
Article 4.3 provides that an organization shall be presumed to have
significant market power when it has a share of more than twenty-
five percent of a particular telecommunications market in the
geographical area of a Member State."'
The Member States have to ensure that they remove any
restrictions that prevent authorized organizations from freely
negotiating interconnection agreements among themselves in
slightly from the one adopted in the Services Directive; it is suggested that the two
should be identical to preclude any doubt in interpretation. See Services Directive, supra
note 3, arts. 1-2, at 15-16.
214 This concept of public networks is "comparable with the common carrier
concept in the United States." Ungerer, EC Competition Law, supra note 76, at 1167
n.202.
215 Interconnection Directive, supra note 36, art. 1, at 36.
216 Interconnection Directive, supra note 36, art. 4.2, at 37. Note, however, the
exception afforded by Article 10, which applies the "essential requirements" as specified
in Article 3(2) of the ONP Directive. See id. art. 10, at 41. Article 3(2) states that the
restriction of access to the public telecommunications networks may be allowed if there
are "essential requirements" namely, "security of network operations," "maintenance of
network integrity," "interoperability of services, in justified cases," and "protection of
data, as appropriate." ONP Directive, supra note 22, art. 3(2).
217 See Interconnection Directive, supra note 36, art. 4.3, at 37. This notion of an
organization with "significant market power" was opposed by the European
Telecommunications Network Operators' Association (ETNO), which dismissed the link
between "market share" and "market power," and thus wanted the rights and obligations
found in the proposal to be applied to all organizations providing public voice
telephony. See Telecommunications: ETNO Raps Interconnection Directive, TECH EUR.,
Jan. 9, 1996, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Eurtch File. Similarly, the EC's
Economic and Social Committee felt that "the obligatory introduction of transparent cost
accounting and interconnection charges determined by costs [in Article 7 of the
Interconnection Directive] should be extended to all organizations which operated
public telecommunications networks. It seems arbitrary to restrict them to organizations
with 'significant market power'. . . ." Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee
on the 'Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on Interconnection in
Telecommunications with Regard to Ensuring Universal Service and Interoperability
through Application of the Principles of Open Network Provision,' 1996 O.J. (C 153)
21.
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accordance with Community Law."' The attitude is that
commercial negotiation should form the primary basis for
interconnection agreements, although Annex VII defines certain
areas where the NRA may set ex ante conditions as part of the
framework for negotiation on the interconnection agreements.1 9
These include requirements for, inter alia, the provision of equal
access and number portability, collocation and a dispute resolution
procedure.2 20
Other requirements of the directive include non-discrimination
and transparency in the terms of interconnection offered by the
TOs, the requirement of public access to interconnection
agreements, and six months advance notification of any changes in
interconnection arrangements to the party considering
interconnection.22 ' The Directive also requires introduction of
number portabilitY222 by January 1, 200323 and encourages
collocation and sharing of facilities where the TO has the right
under national legislation to expropriate or use public or private
property for the installation of facilities.224
Finally, the Directive sets the general responsibilities of the
NRAs,22  including dispute resolution for interconnection
2,8 See Interconnection Directive, supra note 36, art. 3.1, at 36.
219 See id. Annex VII, pt. 1, at 52.
220 See id.
22 See id. art. 6(b), at 38. Non-discrimination and transparency include the
application of similar conditions in similar circumstances to interconnection
organizations providing similar services.
222 Number portability will permit users to switch from one telecommunications
carrier to another without having to change their existing telecommunications numbers.
Thus, it is an extremely important consideration for customers (particularly businesses)
thinking of switching from the services provided by a TO and those offered by a new
entrant.
223 See Interconnection Directive, supra note 36, art. 3.1, at 36. Some of the
Member States, such as Austria, Germany, Spain, Greece and Italy, consider this date
"too early" and unrealistic. See Telecommunications: Council Experts Dissect
Interconnection Directive, TECH EUR., Feb. 8, 1996, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
Eurtch File. However, number portability is absolutely essential to effective
competition.
224 See id. art. 11, at 41. "The requirement for collocation applies 'where essential
requirements deprive other organizations of access to viable alternatives."' Id.
225 See id. art. 9, at 39-40.
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agreements."' In the original Interconnection Directive, 27 either
party in a dispute over the terms of interconnection had the right to
refer the dispute to the Commission for conciliation.
Alternatively, the NRA could, with the agreement of the parties,
refer the dispute to the Commission for resolution."8 The removal
of these provisions in the final joint text of the Directive indicates
the Commission's desire to encourage decentralized application of
the competition rules by national courts and NRAs unless a
significant Community interest is implicated in a particular case.
Although "complaints should, as a rule, be handled by the national
courts or other relevant authorities ,'' 29 the Commission may still
become involved by utilizing Regulation 17, "by way of a
notification of an access agreement," "by way of a complaint
against a restrictive access agreement" or abuse of dominance, "by




1. The American Approach
In the United States, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) has undertaken a similar revolution in the regulation of
interconnection' through the implementation of the United States'
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the 1996 Act).2 2  The FCC
226 See id. arts. 9.5, 17, at 40, 43. In Article 22.2 of the Directive there is a
commitment by the Commission to examine the grounds for establishment of a
European Regulatory Authority (ERA) and relort to the Parliament and Council "not
later than Dec. 31, 1999." Id. at 44. The issues surrounding the establishment of an
ERA will be considered in a later section of this Article.
227 See 1995 O.J. (C 313) 7.
228 See id. art. 9.5.
229 Draft Notice, supra note 31, at 12.
230 Id. at 13.
231 See First Report and Order, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions
in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 45,476 (1996) [hereinafter First
Report and Order].
232 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
(to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 151). The 1996 Act has requirements similar to the
Interconnection Directive in terms of unbundled access, etc. As for interconnection
pricing, section 252(d) provides that the "just and reasonable" rate for interconnection
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Regulations dictate precisely how interconnection charges are to
be calculated, mandating that all state commissions employ the
"total element long-run incremental cost" (TELRIC) method to
calculate the costs that an incumbent Local Exchange Carrier
(LEC) incurs in making its facilities available to competitors.233
TELRIC allows the incumbent LEC to recover "the forward-
looking costs directly attributable to the specified element, as well
as a reasonable allocation of forward-looking common costs., 234
The incumbent LECs have objected vociferously to the regulations
for two reasons. First, the LECs argue that the regulations fail to
consider their "historical" or "embedded" costs in calculating the
cost figure to be used to determine interconnection rates.235
Second, the regulations require that an incumbent LEC's cost be
measured as if the LEC were using the most efficient technology
available at that time, regardless of the technology actually being
employed.236 In Iowa State Utilities Board v. FCC,23 7 the Eighth
Circuit granted a stay of the First Report and Order.23 The court
also ruled that the FCC exceeded its jurisdiction by promulgating
shall be "based on the cost of providing the interconnection," be "nondiscriminatory"
and "may include a reasonable profit." Id. at 67.
233 First Report and Order, supra note 231, at 45,544. This is a species of total
service long-run incremental cost (TSLRIC). See id. The interconnection rate is
determined to allow for a reasonable profit after the cost figure using TELRIC is
established. See id.
234 Id. at 45,545.
235 See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 109 F.3d 418, 422 (8th Cir. 1996). Historical or
embedded costs are those that the incumbent incurred in the past.
236 See id. "Prices for interconnection and access to unbundled elements would be
developed from a forward-looking economic cost methodology based on the most
efficient technology deployed in the incumbent LEC's current wire center locations."
First Report and Order, supra note 231, at 45,545. The FCC claims that this approach
encourages facilities-based competition to the extent that new entrants are able to
provide the service at a lower cost than the incumbent LEC by designing more efficient
network configurations.
237 109 F.3d 418 (8th Cir. 1996), motion to stay denied, 117 S. Ct. 429 (1996).
238 See 120 F.3d 753 (1997). Oral arguments were heard on Jan. 17, 1997 on the
legality of the FCC Regulations. See Baby Bells Say: Wrong Number, NAT. L.J., Feb. 3,
1997, at Al. The stay expired after the Circuit Court decision on July 18, 1997. See
Iowa Utils. Bd., 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997). The Circuit judge overturned specific
provisions of the FCC rules, but declined "to vacate the FCC's entire First Report and
Order." Id. at 819.
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pricing rules.239
Several incumbent LECs want to use the opportunity
cost/efficient component pricing rule (ECPR) as suggested by
William Baumol. Under the ECPR, the price of an input should be
equal to the incremental cost of the input plus the opportunity cost
that the incumbent carrier incurs when the new entrant, instead of
the incumbent, provides the services.2"o The argument in favor of
ECPR is that it would ensure that new entrants will gain access to
the market only where they can operate at least as efficiently, or
more efficiently, than the incumbent operator.24' This is an
improper method for setting prices of interconnection "because the
existing retail prices that would be used to compute incremental
opportunity costs under ECPR are not cost-based."2 42
2. The European Approach
The position in Europe regarding the use of the ECPR is
similar. A report to the European Commission 43 has pointed out
that the problem with the ECPR is that "any level of opportunity
cost could be calculated into a given access price with impunity,"
allowing an incumbent TO to control the structure of retail prices,
and thus possibly act contrary to Article 86 of the EC Treaty. 244 In
addition, the ECPR assumes that the incumbent is "producing
efficiently, earning no monopoly profit and finally that there is no
product differentiation." 24 As such, the report recommended that
some form of average incremental costs (AIC) be used in the
calculation of interconnection prices. 246 Recognition of the EC
proves most telling:
A number of pricing rules have been proposed in the literature,
based on theoretical models .... [B]ecause of the wide range of
possible outcomes and because of the complicated interaction of
239 See id.
240 See First Report and Order, supra note 227, at 45,548 (1996).
241 See Iowa Utils. Bd., 120 F.3d at 812.
242 First Report and Order, supra note 231, at 45,548.
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variables that regulators find difficult to observe, the theoretical
models are likely to provide insight but little practical
applicability for the regulator.2 47
Thus, the Commission has taken the most sensible approach-
a flexible one. Article 7 of the Interconnection Directive, and
Annexes IV and V, lay down the principles for interconnection
charges and cost accounting systems.148 Therefore, the European
approach is far less dogmatic than the American one.
Article 7.2 merely states that charges for interconnection "shall
follow the principles of transparency and cost orientation," and
that charges are to be derived from actual costs including a
reasonable rate of return on investment.24 9 Annex V provides the
NRAs, "by way of example," with a non-exhaustive list of
elements that should be included in the cost accounting systems
used by the TOs.210 These include "fully distributed costs, long-run
average incremental costs, marginal costs, stand-alone costs,
embedded direct costs, etc." 25' It is significant that unlike the
forward-looking American approach, Annex V states that the cost
base(s) used can be "historic costs based on actual expenditure
incurred for equipment and systems or forward-looking costs
based on estimated replacement costs of equipment or systems. 252
Further, Annex V does not necessarily imply that under the
forward-looking approach prices would be based on the most
efficient technology deployed in the incumbent TO's current wire
locations. The European TOs would not appear to have the same
concerns raised by the LECs in the Iowa State Utilities Board
litigation.
247 WIK-NETwoRK INTERCONNECTION IN THE DOMAIN OF ONP: STUDY FOR THE DG
XIII OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT, (1994) cited in COUDERT BROS.,
supra note 38, at 76.
248 Article 4a of the Full Competition Directive requires incumbent TOs to publish
their interconnection terms and conditions by July 1, 1997 and to continue publishing
for a period of five years during the transition to a competitive environment. See supra
note 22 and accompanying text.
249 Interconnection Directive, supra note 36, art. 7.2, at 38.
250 See id. Annex V, at 50.
251 Id.
252 Id. (emphasis added).
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The approach taken by the Commission regarding
interconnection pricing is more sensible than the one taken by the
FCC. However, one potential weakness exists. Article 7.5 of the
Interconnection Directive effectively leaves NRAs with the
responsibility of ensuring that the cost accounting systems used by
the TOs are "suitable for implementation of the requirements" of
the article in the hands of the NRAs.2 3 The question remains
whether the NRAs will consistently apply the economic and
accounting principles across the European Community or whether
such a task is better handled by a European Regulatory Authority
(ERA). 4 Of course, this concern applies to any aspect of decision-
making by the NRAs, but it may be argued that NRAs should have
less discretion in interconnection pricing, since it involves almost
pure calculation. The current problem is that the state regulators255
have seen the fixing of interconnection tariffs purely as a matter of
bilateral negotiation between operators, leaving the dominant TO
in a very powerful negotiating position.256 While the aim of
allowing commercial negotiation to serve as the primary basis for
interconnection agreements is laudable, the effect may be
detrimental to new entrants if the NRAs are unwilling to assume a
more active role in the process leading to full competition in the
sector.
253 Interconnection Directive, supra note 36, art. 7.5, at 39.
254 See generally FORRESTER ET AL., THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE
REGULATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE APPLICATION OF EC COMPETITION RULE:
REPORT TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION (DG IV) (1996).
255 While the NRAs are being created, the ministers of posts and
telecommunications often serve as state regulators.
256 New entrants are complaining about this fact. See, e.g., OMNITEL Calls for EU
Intervention on Interconnection Charges, TECH EUR., May 13, 1997, available in
LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Eurtch File; Deutsche Telecom Faces Challenge Over
Interconnection Rates; EUR. TELECOMMUNICATIONS, May 2, 1997, available in 1997
WL 8803604; Interconnection Snags for Telfort, EUR. TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Apr. 18,
1997, available in 1997 WL 8803578.
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Article 7.5 of the Directive does require the Commission to
write recommendations on cost accounting systems and account
separation in relation to interconnection, and it will prove
interesting to note the extent to which the recommendations will
crystallize the wide scope of Article 7 and Annexes IV and V.
211
While the FCC's approach to interconnection pricing may be
criticized for being too narrow and restrictive, the scope of Annex
V is so wide that no sensibly consistent determinations can be
made. 2 ' For example, historic costs and forward-looking costs
may be weighed in many ways. Allowing the TO in effect to
choose the cost base gives it latitude that may result in a higher
connection charge than a new entrant should reasonably have to
pay. Again, Annex V allows costs standards including fully
distributed costs (FDCs). Unfortunately, "mainstream economics
has dismissed FDCs for years." '259 Recently, two economists have
charged that "FDCs have no theoretical foundation, are necessarily
arbitrary, and cannot be used in any meaningful way to establish
prices, or set upper of lower bounds for pricing. They are also
useless for establishing a standard for cross-subsidy or anti-
257 At the time this Article went to print, the Commission had just published its
Commission Recommendation on Interconnection in a Liberalized Telecommunications
Market Part-i- Interconnection Pricing, (C97) 3148, 15 October 1997 (visited Oct. 25,
1997) <http://www.ispo.cec.be/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/r3l48-en.htm>. The
Commission clearly states that interconnection cost should be calculated on the basis of
forward-looking long run average incremental costs (LRAIC) because these costs
closely approximate those of an efficient operator employing modem technology. See id.
recommendation 3. Further, the use of LRAIC implies a cost accounting system using
activity based allocation of current costs rather than historic costs. See id.
recommendation 6. Thus, the Commission has taken a more narrow and restrictive view
of interconnection policy than is apparent from the Interconnection Directive. That will
hopefully serve to alleviate the potential weaknesses of the statement on pricing in the
Interconnection Directive identified in this Article. However, it should be remembered
that while Directives are binding on Member States, recommendations are not. See id.
Explanatory Memorandum. See generally EC TREATY art. 189. Further, the NRAs are
still the central figures in the area of interconnection pricing despite the recommendation
and the fact that fears of the lack of independence of these newly created NRAs may still
exist. See infra notes 264-69.
258 Apart from the LEC's complaints, the state commissions themselves were
displeased at what they perceive to be federal usurpation of their powers.
259 Alexander C. Larson & Steve G. Parsons, "Building Block" Cost Methods for
Pricing and Unbundling Telecommunications Services: Implications for the Law and
Regulatory Policy, 36 JURIMETRICS J. 59, 76 (1995).
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competitive practices.''2 Therefore, the Commission has the
difficult task of formulating the expected recommendations. The
NRA's tasks also prove less than straightforward.
Finally, Article 7.4 of the Interconnection Directive requires,
like the FCC Regulations, that charges for interconnection shall be
"sufficiently unbundled" so the new entrant will not be required to
pay for anything not related to the service requested.261 The TOs
must establish separate prices for components of services, instead
of offering one "bundled" price for the total service.262 It remains
unclear, however, if this will always create a desirable result for
the new entrant. After all, it is generally known that prices for a
"bundle" of services need not be equal to the sum of prices of each
individual service comprising the package.263  The offering of
discount prices for buying "in bulk" is a technique often used by
supermarkets, for example. Perhaps the proper way to view the
policy of "unbundling" is to consider whether such unbundling
will actually result in a more competitive downstream market. The
point is to ensure that unbundling is not pursued merely as an end
in itself.
VI. Conclusion
The issues examined in this Article are by no means
exhaustive. However, at this stage of the liberalization process, the
Commission is fully stretched by its efforts to ensure coherence in
the policies which must be adopted for full liberalization to
succeed. Clearly, the Commission, particularly the DGIV, in its
present form is not physically capable of overseeing and analyzing
every aspect of access and interconnection.
The Draft Notice makes it clear that the NRAs will play a vital
role in complementing the Commission's role at the national level.
The Commission intends to concentrate on notifications,
complaints and own-initiative proceedings: "having particular
political, economic or legal significance for the Community...
260 Id.
261 See Interconnection Directive, supra note 36, art. 7.4.
262 See id.
263 See, e.g., Preston McAfee et al., Multiproduct Monopoly Commodity Bundling,
and Correlation of Values, 104 Q.J. EcON. 371 (1989).
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complaints should, as a rule, be handled by national courts or other
relevant authorities."'2"
The ever-widening scope of the Commission's duties in the
competition area has prompted some debate as to whether there
should be a pan-European competition agency separated from the
Commission. But the Commission is not enamored of the idea,
mainly because of possible inconsistencies between competition
and Community policies. 65 There has also been some serious
consideration of whether there should be a European Regulatory
Authority (ERA) to oversee the liberalization process in the
telecommunications sector.2" The Bangemann Report267 clearly
recommended the creation of such an agency. Under Article 22 of
the Interconnection Directive, by December 31, 1999, the
Commission will have to submit a report on the added value of the
setting up of an ERA to carry out those tasks which would prove
to be better undertaken at Community level.26 This may be too
long a time to wait for an ERA. After all, over time, competition
rules will emerge as the dominant regulatory tool. The need for an
264 Draft Notice, supra note 31, at 12-13. At the time of writing, few Member
States have established NRAs. Regulation at this point is left to the relevant ministry
(usually that of posts and telecommunications, and occasionally transport). One of the
pressing concerns is that NRAs must be independent in order to ensure fairness in the
marketplace. In the Netherlands, for example, there are complaints from the main new
entrant, Telfort (a joint venture between British Telecoms and the Dutch Railways), that
Opta, the regulator being established, may not be independent because it is being created
out of the existing supervisory department within the telecommunications division of the
transport ministry. Telfort argues that if Opta is to have teeth it should be able to subject
KPN's (the incumbent TO) calculations of interconnection charges to scrutiny by
outside auditors. See Interconnection Snags for Telfort, EUR. TELECOMMUNICATIONS,
Apr. 18, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8803578.
265 See Karel Van Miert, The Proposal for a European Competition Agency, 2
COMP. POL'Y NEWSL., Summer 1996, at 1; see also Alissa A. Meade, Modeling a
European Competition Authority, 46 DUKE L.J. 153 (1996).
266 See FORRESTER ET AL., supra note 254. The study found that cooperation
between NRAs, National Competition Authorities (NCAs) and the Commission is
seriously limited, and also that the independence of certain NRAs is questionable. See
id.
267 See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EUROPE AND THE GLOBAL
INFORMATION SOCIETY, REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP ON THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY, RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE EUROPEAN CoUNcIL (1994).
268 See Interconnection Directive, supra note 36, art. 22.2, at 44.
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ERA, if there is one, would be felt most at the initial stages of
liberalization. At any rate, the recommendation is to concentrate
on closer and more effective cooperation between the NRAs,
NCAs and the Commission, to ensure that there is a strong link
maintained between the regulatory and the competition aspects of
telecommunications.269
269 See FORRESTER ET AL., supra note 254. The Commission has indicated that
"from a purely institutional point of view it is really up to the Member States where they
want to draw the line between the responsibilities of their competition authorities in the
telecoms area and that of the telecoms regulators." Ungerer, supra note 28.
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